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[The]

understanding which is relevant to the sciences of man is something
more than this implicit grasp on things. It is related rather to the kind of
understanding we invoke in personal relations when we say, for instance: ‘I
find him hard to understand’; or at last I understand her’. To switch for a
minute to another language, it is the kind of understanding one invokes in
French when one says ‘maintenant on s’entend’. We are talking here in these
cases of what you could call human understanding, understanding what makes
someone tick, or how he feels or acts as a human being. (Taylor, 1980, p. 30).

Introduction
John Roberts has argued that a corporation cares about how you perceive it. In his article “No
one is perfect: The limits of transparency and an ethic for ‘intelligent accountability’ he offers a
way to think about the limits of transparency. The argument is based on the supposition that
corporations are able to utilise reform measures based around concepts such as forgiveness,
openness and transparency. Roberts’ message is that these reforms may not lead to the desired
outcomes when in fact transparency can actually diminish accountability.
Roberts follows Derrida, Lacan and Levinas in exploring the argument that because we
never quite know the outcomes of our actions it is therefore not possible to specify desired
corporate outcomes. In this paper, I offer an alternate view that it is imperative we articulate and
acknowledge the sources of our identity and the structures of closeness, openness and
transparency that shape communities. For the purposes of this present paper, accountability,
forgiveness and transparency are important ways to think about how our presence in the world is

recognised. This is an important point given accountability is such an ambiguous ideal that one
wonders whether true meaning can be expressed through a postmodern emphasis on
dissemination and fragmentation. What are the true intentions of any interlocutor? Are there any
authentic interpretations of actions such as transparency?
The emphasis and process of dissemination within postmodern quarters, I maintain, is
part of a Derridean quest to unravel truth regimes and then explore the implications of particular
concepts, ideas and value systems. My counter argument is that a process that focuses on the
power of dissemination itself has the potential to become a truth regime that imposes a particular
world view on communities. The issue, then, becomes one of finding a means to combine
different world-views in a postmodern world of half-understood social and structural domination.
What role can accounting, accountability and organisational theory perform in this world?
In contrast to an ethic of accountability based on a postmodern conception of
dissemination, I argue that we must acknowledge, explore and articulate the sources of our
identity. It is important that we know precisely what we aim to do and work towards healing
differences in the creation of commonalities when constructing a world where accountability is a
real ideal. To do otherwise, is to fall victim to the (anti)-structures of a postmodern vision. This
is a vision of a world shaped by the nihilism that is implicit in the supposition that we never quite
know what we are doing. Such a world has the potential to fragment the existing social fabric
such that we perpetuate a vision of the world where we do not quite know what we are doing? I
argue that the quest for such a vision of accountability leads only to anomie, disharmony and
fragmentation between interlocutors.
It is worth remembering, at this point, that Roberts began his analysis utilizing a set of
issues from the Governor of the Bank of England to whom transparency worked to further the

recent financial crisis. The Governor pointed out that given the easing of financial constraint
there are ‘bare’ bottoms for all to see and this perpetuated the financial spiral downward. The
credit crisis, he argued, caused much hardship and no-one can be proud of what has happened.
Roberts utilized this example to continue his critique of the criterion of transparency itself has
led to some of the panic even though it has been proffered as a panacea to solve our corporate
ailments. Roberts began by quoting Charlie McGreevy:

In appropriate circumstances, transparency has a useful role to play; for
example, when it comes to dealing with opaque financial instruments. But I
have always been of the view that when the stability of a financial institution is
at risk, the situation is best resolved behind closed doors. Unfortunately, in
recent weeks, gold-plated transparency rules stood in the way of a quiet
resolution of a problem before it became a crisis. The result was that
transparency rules that were intended to underpin investor confidence, when
put to the test, actually promoted investor panic. It would surely be
irresponsible for the regulators not to reflect on this experience and not to draw
the appropriate lessons. Clearly transparency that culminates in panic, followed
by a rescue, followed by the proliferation of moral hazard is transparency that
we would be better off without. Charlie McCreevy, European Internal Market
Commissioner, 26 October 2007.

He argues that corporations want to be perceived as it sees itself, not necessarily as it really is.
The issues involve whether corporations can ever be accountable and how the corporate social

reform project can achieve its aim. Arguably, this involves reconciling the corporation with its
communities. But the question then arises: should we speak about accountability in this context?
More generally, does it make sense to speak about accountability in order to achieve
reconciliation or attempt to minimize our impact on the natural environment and others?
Roberts is certainly sympathetic with the function of such objectives but I argue that to focus
on the unknowing is at the expense of bringing things further to light. Here, it seems that the
critique of transparency is based on what seems to be a Derridean aporia: that is, real
transparency only comes into play when we reach beyond the point of that which is totally nontransparent.

Like many of Derrida’s aporias the ideal of forgiveness, hospitality and

transparency to examine a few operates by intensifying our relationship to the concept. Roberts
adapts this argument to deepen our responsibility and obligation to the ideal of transparency. In
a similar way to other aporias – such as forgiveness or hospitality – the aim of the analysis is to
move beyond superficial interpretation and analysis.
Transparency as a concept worthy of its name must reflect a forgiveness that is beyond the
transparent and unforgivable. In unpacking Roberts’ argument it will be recalled that Derridean
aporias maintained that concepts such as forgiveness are impossible.

Transparency like

forgiveness should not be: it does not exist. One should not forgive per se. That all we can
forgive therefore is the unthinkable. But I will argue that he does not think that it is appropriate
to speak about accountability and transparency in regard to such public acts of corporate reform
initiatives.
Roberts argues that the “pure” unconditional concept of transparency, like forgiveness, is
unlikely to achieve its stated aim to do with reconciliation, redemption, or salvation. Like
forgiveness, accountability only comes into its own when we begin to think within intelligible

structures and interrogate the structure (in this case transparency is another aporia for us to
consider).

Transparency: A Concept and Genealogy of The Aporia.
In what follows, I explore how transparency can work as an ideal to make better judgments and
inform relevant publics. Moreover, I argue against the impossibility of accountability and
transparency even though I may fear the exposure that the process may create. From the
interpretivist perspective, that I consider appropriate, I am at the same time encouraging us to
take pride in what is disclosed. As such the ideal of accountability and reconciliation is a
chimera.
Roberts’ paper began with this quotation before moving being inspired by reading
Butler’s (2005) book Giving an Account of Oneself.

Here Butler argues that it is simply

impossible to give a full account of oneself; any account fails by virtue of that which is
unavoidably opaque to the self. This is both in relation to the origins and drivers of my own
agency and the social norms and categories which furnish me with the frames within which I
structure any account. This forces us to investigate what is of concern to Roberts as it involves
how transparency contains these dual and contrasting potentials. These potentials may be held
perhaps in binary form; it promises and threatens to reveal or discover ‘the self as good or bad,
clothed or naked, beautiful or ugly’ (Roberts, 2009, p. 958).
Roberts then moves to insights from Emanuell Levinas to examine the criterion of
accountability and the ideal of transparency. The overall conclusion, the quest for transparency,
is a flawed in that such concepts impose structures on organisations from which people cannot
escape. In the process of interrogating the ideal of transparency:

[T]he impossibility of my giving a full account of myself, lies not only in the
way that it brings into sharp relief the anxiety, ‘violence and narcissism that are
a routine part of accountability as transparency, but also in the way that it
furnishes us with an ethic of humility and generosity with which to approach
intelligent accountability (Roberts, 2009, p. 969).

The end product of this deliberation, inspired by Butler’s thinking, is that a new ethic of
accountability is required (but more on this later). Here Roberts echoes Derrida’s work on
forgiveness in that we never quite know if it is possible to arrive at a full appreciation of the
concept and its meaning.
Arguably, it is because forgiveness seems to become impossible that forgiveness finds a
starting point, a new starting-point. Roberts argues that in relation to myself there is a certain
compassion to be demanded if I can acknowledge that I can never quite know what it is that I am
doing. Accordingly, it is then possible to be more modest about myself and more willing to
acknowledge the value of the abilities and capacities of different others, and my dependence
upon them. Roberts continues:

To acknowledge my own incoherence is, however, to discover others’
incoherence – the always frail and partial grounds upon which their own
demands on me are built. What emerges in this space is something of the
weight of our practical dependence upon each other which accountability as
talk, listening, and asking questions then allows us to explore and investigate.
Accountability is thereby reconstituted as a vital social practice – an exercise of

care in relation to self and others, a caution to compassion in relation to both
self and others, and an ongoing necessity as a social practice through which to
insist upon and discover the nature of our responsibility to and for each other
(Roberts, 2009, p. 969).

In this passage, Roberts (2009) utilises the structure of an aporia that concerns what it is we are
doing as accountants and whether transparency is a useful concept. The implication is that
accountability offers ambivalent and contestable implications. How do we know what we are
doing? What are the implications of our accountability mechanisms? Are we ever fully aware of
what we are doing?

Environmental Transparency: Early Aporias
The ideal of accountability and criteria, such as closeness and transparency, assume any failure
of governance can be overcome by additional information in the public sphere.

From an

accountability perspective, transparency involves greater disclosure or new objects of disclosure,
as if the solution lies simply in finding ways of seeing more sharply or more completely. This is
the logic that Michael Power first explored in the ‘audit explosion’ and the faith that the
following quote from Gray expresses in relation to the potential of greater transparency:
[T]o create environmental responsibility. ‘The development of accountability
increases the transparency of organisations. That is it increases the number of
things that are made visible, increases the number of ways in which things are
made visible, and in doing so encourages a greater openness. The inside of the

organisation becomes more visible, that is transparent’. (Gray, 2009 found in
Roberts 2009).
Indeed, as the ecological crisis has deepened a raft of accountability literature has attempted to
fill out accounting’s role as a mechanism to alter corporate direction and minimise ecological
impacts. This is because there is nothing left other than personal and subjective interpretations,
where environmental protection groups would be assumed merely seeks to maximise their own
interests. It is therefore problematic whether nature’s intrinsic value is independent of valuing
subjects or reflects different bands of power and knowledge. The worry is that this decentred
argument can be used to support apolitical perspectives such that no environmental crisis exists
Wildavsky (1994); or, that more procedure puts us in touch with the external world (see Simnett
et al. 2009).

On such an anti-realist view, there exists no environmental crisis and any

conception of a crisis merely reflects a certain epistemological conception of that reality. And
even if such a crisis can be proven to exist, it is possible that new procedural statements
(assurance) will save the day.
From an accountability perspective Gray (2002) argued for a conception of accountability
that would inform relevant publics and emphasised localised struggles as opposed to more ivory
tower research. Critics of such environmental accounting reforms, emanating from postmodern
quarters, through to the public sphere, such as those associated with the Foucaultian School of
thought emphasise subjectivity, fragmentation and a need to deconstruct traditional metaphysical
assumptions (Connolly, 1993). But is what we are doing actually helping the planet, or just
making us feel better about ourselves?

Extending these ideas to environmental and

accountability processes leads to the conclusion that there are no necessary reasons why one

interpretation of nature is better than any other. One wonders whether the natural environment
should not be preserved or whether it should be framed as a sign in virtual reality.

The Impossibility.
From the perspective pioneered by Derrida and utilised by Butler (2006), all we can do is to
explore the aporias that are put before us. From Derrida we have learnt to deconstruct the text to
understand all the forces at play (Arrington and Francis, 1989). From Roberts (2009) we learn
about the impossibility of accountability and transparency: the quest is to make us more aware of
the other.

The argument involves not only the fact that we cannot manage only with

transparency but develop accountability with the notion of an intelligent accountability.
Transparency becomes a supplement to intelligent accountability. Roberts argues:

The transparency of ‘fair value’, coupled with intense individual performance
incentives, was arguably itself part of the problem; feeding ‘over optimism’ in
financial markets, as well as the subsequent panic as asset values were written
down (see Roberts & Jones, 2009). Significantly, informed insiders to the
credit crisis have subsequently suggested the need not only for enhanced
transparency, but also for new forms of accountability that supplement reliance
on risk management models with institution wide brain storming around
sources of risk, and that supplement institutional disclosure against Basel 11
with regular meetings between central bankers and individual institutions to
review systemic risk (CRMPG, 2008). In such suggestions there is possibly a
tacit. (Roberts, 2009, p. 968).

Transparency itself can become a veil of tears when it impinges on our ability to lead full lives.
The ideal of transparency reflects the nothingness that exists outside a text or particular linguistic
phenomenon. Derrida says of a limitless text that:

[It] presupposes that in no instance can one fix something outside of the sphere
of the differential referrals, that would be something real, a presence, or an
absence, something which itself would not be marked through the textual
difference. (Engelman quoting Derrida, 1987, pp. 107-108). [

Here, Derrida is claiming that ‘reality is a text’ where the text is ‘an openness without limits to
the differential referral.’

Derrida’s interpretation of language, therefore, has profound

implications for the social sciences and how we think about the social sphere, our relations to
others and the external world. On such a depoliticised view, there exists no reason to preserve
the natural environment, support an ideal of transparency or forgive the unforgivable. These
arguments in turn reflect an anti-realist view that we can never come in contact with the natural
environment: the politics of the public sphere become trivialised and our vista to the world
through bodily engagement and perception become marginalised. Accordingly, accountability is
a chimera – like forgiveness it is an endless impossibility and true reconciliation only begins
when we investigate its negation.

Can I ever know what I am doing?
Furthermore, on the Butler-Derrida-Levinas perspective the role of interpretation and
understanding in the public sphere might become nothing more than the endless play of

difference.

There exist no settled, unique or singular solutions.

Derrida, and others of a

postmodern persuasion, stress the fragmentation and decentring of the subject that is a
consequence of a fragmentary conception of the role of language and interpretation. These
arguments, I contend, perpetuate the fragmentation of the public sphere and the dissemination of
the politics of the good that has the potential to empower our stronger evaluations.
Here it is useful to refer to those liberal attempts to inform the public sphere actually
utilise the philosophical resources of democratic openness and community based conceptions of
closeness. Like forgiveness and transparency, the ideal of closeness has been criticised by
postmodern theorists. Thus far I have attempted to give a sympathetic account of Roberts
account of transparency and its connections with Derrida’s work on aporias (such as forgiveness,
openness and transparency).

I want to go further, however, to begin to think about

accountability, forgiveness and transparency to reveal the structure of the aporia and the integrity
of these constructs.
This present paper finds the same “logic” at work in Roberts (2009) and the same
tracking down of aporias. This logic is revealed in the same insistence on the way in which the
‘unconditional and the conditional are heterogeneous and indissociable’ in other conceptual
genealogies (for example, Derrida’s genealogy of hospitality, language and religion (Bernstein,
2006, p. 399)). Arguably, this leads to further difficulties when we try to consider how Derrida’s
work on forgiveness reverberates throughout the interrogation of other aporias. For current
purposes this tracking down of aporias and the logic on which they are based impacts on Roberts
(2006) concern with transparency and repairing organizational relationships.
This present paper attempts to consider and develop that interrogation by considering the
role of accounting and accountability in a world where public intervention and social awareness

have become so trivialised. The modern world seems to have created a social structure where
prospects of revolutionary change are now a distant dream. From this perspective, the recent
wave of Foucaultian and Derridian research attempts to transform modernity but these strategies
themselves might just be interpreted as just an[other] strategy to reform modernity. Central to
my reflections on forgiveness and transparency involve thinking about how and whether our
visions of the world are able to transform and change the world.

Transparency as Accountability: Interpretation as the Real.
Roberts argues that Butler and O’Neill suggest a way toward an ethic for an intelligent
accountability as a strategy to shape the contours of democratic accountability and transparency.
An intelligent accountability would be one that accommodates the contingent view of the self
and is guided by the view that we can never quite know what we are doing self. A contingent
vision of the self requires an ethical sensibility sufficiently robust to accommodate in pragmatistlike fashion these complexities.

The contingency and irony implicit in an intelligent

accountability provides accountants, managers and regulators sufficient scope to accommodate
these variable factors and features of the self. However, there are important and consequential
differences concerning what one judges to be accountable, unaccountable, unforgivable and
forgivable. Richard J. Bernstein explained:
And furthermore, the boundary between what is unforgivable and forgivable is
open to dispute. In deciding what is unforgivable and forgivable, fallible risky
judgments are always involved. There is no escape from judgment. Derrida
would never even be able to state his aporia unless he presupposed that we
could make a “rigorous” distinction between the unforgivable and the

forgivable –and between unconditional and conditional forgiveness. But I am
inclined to say –in the spirit of Wittgenstein – that there is no rigorous
distinction between what is unforgivable and forgivable except the line that we
draw (Bernstein, 2006, p. 401).

As an Aristotelian one is able to argue that a separation is not a distinction. This reflects an
observation made by Arrington and Francis that Derrida offers us a deconstructive way to
visualise the world. Here it is useful to remember that Derrida maintains that language ‘is not an
instrumental medium referring to entities in the external world, but is instead a self-referring,
indefinitely complex, open-ended, differential system of signifiers.’ 1 This claim goes to the heart
of Derrida’s objective of dismantling and replacing the narrative of traditional philosophy and
moving away from those artificial and impositional attempts to create the condition for truth in
morality and discourse. Hannah Arendt referred to this process as an attempt to think without
banisters.

Nevertheless, the Derridean aim is to engage in free exchange, which is not

constrained by pre-determined truth regimes or thinking with barristers. It is for this reason that
Derrida argued that ‘there is no extratext…There is nothing before the text; there is no pretext
that is not already text.’ 2 We are simply signifiers floating in the world and there are no firm
foundations for us to cling to.
For Roberts’ a fusion of ideas that draws on Butler, Derrida and Levinas illustrates that
there are no straightforward correlation exists between the validity claims we express and fixed
external reality. 3 The aims of forgiveness and transparency fail to achieve their stated objectives.

1

Ibid.

2

Derrida, J., Positions, (trans. Alan Bass), Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1981, p. 26.
Zimmerman, Contesting Earths’ Future, op. cit., p. 382.

3

Postmodern theorists, often inspired by the work of Derrida in this regard, argue that language is
not constitutive of morality nor does it disclose anything in particular. Nor does language reflect
reality and cannot put us in touch with the world. That is, language merely reflects, and is
reflective of, some particular conception about what is truth. One consequence is that there are
no necessary constitutive relationships between people and the world. Borrowing Nietzschean
terminology, language and universal claims to truth are merely a reflection of a will to power.
For example, the will to environmental power reflects the interests of some at the expense of the
majority. There are no means to order, or demonstrate why one interpretation is better than
another. It is probably for this reason that Derrideans and Levinasians stress the fragmentary
possibilities that are thrown up to people living their lives in the world.
From a Derridian perspective, all we can do is to deconstruct the text to understand all the
forces at play.

This is because there is nothing left other than personal and subjective

interpretations, where environmental protection groups merely seek to maximise their own
interests. It is therefore problematic whether nature’s intrinsic value is independent of valuing
subjects or reflects different bands of power and knowledge. Nothing exists outside the text.
Derrida utilises literary resources to make the aforementioned point that there is no instance
where one can fix something outside of the sphere of the differential referrals, that would be
something real, a presence, or an absence, something which itself would not be marked through
the textual difference ( Engelmann, 1987, pp. 96-110). For Derrida ‘reality [itself] is a text’
where the text is ‘an openness without limits to the differential referral.’ (Engelmann, 1987, p.
96) His interpretation of language, therefore, has profound implications for the social sciences
and how we think about being, nature, organisations and society. For example, what happens to

nature whilst we wait for the transition to this new postmodern world? Here one of the core
features of Derrida’s work emerges as it concernsdecision and responsibility.
On the current reading of Derrida and Levinas – and Roberts for present purposes – there
exists an infatuation with decision and responsibility (see Bernstein, 2006, p. 398). Forgiveness
and transparency that is worthy of the name is never simply conditional forgiveness on this view.
But neither is it absolutely unconditional. The unstable ‘space’ that is opened by concepts such
as forgiveness, hospitality and transparency leads to an irreducible, heterogeneous tension inbetween these two poles. Accordingly, decision and responsibility take place ‘in this tensed inbetween’ and there is (necessarily) ‘always risk and uncertainty in the experience of passing
through this “space” (Bernstein, 2006, p. 398). Derrida emphasizes this when he writes:

[I]f we want to embody an unconditional forgiveness in history and society, we
have to go through these conditions.

We have to negotiate between the

unconditional and the conditional. They cannot be dissociated, although we
know they are absolutely heterogeneous and incommensurable. It is because
these incommensurable poles are indissociable that we have to take
responsibility, a difficult responsibility, to negotiate the best response in an
impossible situation. (

Derrida, 2001, 28 found in R. J. Bernstein, “Derrida: The Aporia of

Forgiveness’, p. 398).

In this passage it is reasonable to argue that this argument reflects Derrida’s hidden, or perhaps it
is not so hidden, existentialism. This existentialism motivates Roberts and the development of
argument that adapts Derrida’s obsessive thinking on aporias such as forgiveness and language.

Following R. J. Bernstein I mean this as a compliment because the best thinkers are obsessed
with an idea, a theme, or a motif to which they return over and over again.
Furthermore, Derrida in all his writings has been obsessed with decision and
responsibility.

The obsessive motif is that there are no algorithms, no rules, no decision

procedures, nothing that we can rely on in making decisions – including decisions about when,
whom, and what to forgive. Bernstein observes:

He tells that “between the widest, the most refined, the most necessary
knowledge, and the responsible decision, an abyss remains, and must remain”
(54, my italics). There is no real forgiveness unless we pass through this abyss
– the experience of trembling when we struggle with the aporias that we
confront – when we face up to the realization that forgiveness is impossible,
that forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable. When Derrida tells us that
forgiveness is an impossible possible, he is not playing frivolous games with
us. He seeks to intensify the experience of decision and responsibility involved
in forgiveness. We might accuse him of exaggerating, and I do not think he
would deny this. He tells us: “I remain ‘torn’ (between a ‘hyberbolic’ ethical
vision of forgiveness, pure forgiveness, and the reality of a society at work in
pragmatic processes of reconciliation)” (51). He might even cite what Hannah
Arendt once said when she was accused of exaggeration. One can’t really think
without exaggerating. (Bernstein, 2006, p. 399).

For instance, on this Derridean view the role of decision, interpretation and understanding in
modern communities becomes nothing more than the endless play of different interpretations.
Derrida, and other postmodern methods, stress the fragmentation and decentring of the subject.
Arguably, this leads to claims such as those that I presented in the introduction when Roberts
referred us to Gray’s work on closeness, environmental crises and openness which are assumed
to be a(nother) reflection and outcome of an epistemological conception of reality. Roberts is
responding to other critics of the art of interpretation – by postmodernists such as William
Connolly and John Roberts – that emphasise subjectivity, fragmentation and a need to
deconstruct traditional metaphysical assumptions.
Stressing the power of discourse, they argue that language does not reflect any objective
conception of ‘the good’ and therefore no intrinsic values rank higher than anyother. This is
allegedly because all dialogue is a reflection of the subjective preferences of the speaker. In an
environmental, context this would mean that the dilemma between humanity’s transformation of
the natural world turns ecosystems into metaphysical constructs, but this method might have
potentially disastrous consequences for humanity and the natural world. In Hegelian fashion one
may want to argue that the natural environment imposes real constraints on us and to ignore
these constraints jeopardises alternate futures and opportunities to disclose the world.
By way of contrast, I stress the power of discourse to make a judgement. That
transparency, closeness, forgiveness have nothing to do with judgement (phronesis). Notice that
Roberts’ utiliation of Levinas and Butler does not extend to Derrida’s declaration that
“forgiveness has precisely nothing to do with judgment” (43), and he also tells us “forgiveness
has nothing to do with knowledge.”10 Rather obviously the counter argument is that forgiveness
has everything to do with judgment, and that frequently, knowledge is crucial for making a

responsible decision to forgive or not to forgive. This can be undertaken by using ideas from
interpretivist philosophers such as Richard J. Bernstein and Charles Taylor who have pointed out
that Derrida’s work depends on making a ‘rigorous’ distinction between the forgivable and the
unforgivable. But I have argued that the distinction between what is forgivable and unforgivable
is open to dispute and interpretation.
It will be recalled that for Derrida concepts such as forgiveness and transparency it is
useful to remember that we are told that only ‘[f]orgiveness forgives only the unforgivable.’ But
what precisely is unforgivable when it comes to making things transparent? In his analysis of
Derrida’s work on forgiveness, Bernstein then refers us to a debate between Derrida and
Jankelevitch. The latter insisted that the deeds “the Germans” committed in the Shoah are
unforgivable. Jankelevitch explained:

Thus the extermination of the Jews is the product of pure wickedness, of
ontological wickedness, of the most diabolical and gratuitous wickedness that
history has ever known. The crime was not motivated, even by “villainous”
motives. This crime against nature, this unmotivated crime, this exorbitant
crime is thus to the letter a metaphysical crime; and the criminals guilty of this
crime are not mere fanatics, not simply blind doctrinaires, nor abominable
dogmatists – they are, in the proper sense of the word, monsters.11 These
deeds and those who committed them are unforgivable. Hannah Arendt would
not agree with everything that Jankelevitch says here, but she does believe that
the radical evil exhibited in the Nazi death camps – the systematic attempt to

make human beings as human beings superfluous is unforgivable. And Derrida
himself agrees that this radical evil is unforgivable. (Jank´el´evitch, 1996, 556).

Intelligent Accountability: How do we judge what is intelligible?
In the section that follows I return to Roberts’ developments of Judith Butler’s recent work to
explore the possibility of our doing accountability differently. This is based on a conception of
accountability that reflects a conception of conscious and a realistic rejection of this ideal of a
self that is fully transparent to itself. The rationale for accountability, as offered by Roberts, lies
not simply in the pursuit of my own or any other’s perfection: but, rather in the fact that I do not
and can never know quite what it is that I am doing. While it may be argued that my previous
sections may offer a rather simplistic interpretation of Roberts complex argument, the sources he
draws on, and the worldview articulated they did emphasise the need for making judgements.
In this regard I have attempted a more detailed analysis of Roberts and those that he
draws upon such as Levinas, Derrida, and Butler in the context of debates with direct realists
such as Dreyfus and Taylor. In their work there is a means to reveal that their vision of the
world can act to create deeper relationships between people but requires rethinking the
commonalities needed between citizens in a civil society.

Roberts refers to one further

implication of Butler’s turn to Levinas in the requirement that it would be better to ask less of
our bosses and take back some of the shared responsibilities/authorities that we project onto them
(Roberts, 2009, p. 967).
It has been said that further reading of original Derridean and Levinasian sources would
reveal that the lack of firm foundations of the 'self', of identity, subjectivity and sovereignty is,

for these authors, precisely the basis for a much greater ethical subjectivity. This is an ethic
where the 'sovereign self', and the compulsion to 'know thyself' etc, does not take precedent over
the infinite moral responsibility to the Other. Levinas's writings, in particular, are most explicit
on this point: Levinas theorises precisely the responsibility to the other as the basis of any
compelling sense of a unique selfhood. However one may continue and ask precisely what is the
Other to whom I am responsible and how do these arrangements come about.
The present argument is based on a theory of language and realism itself a reflection of
on an optimistic and progressive account of moral reasoning where people are brought together
in an overlapping civil society where human rights are the defining feature of our human
condition. Here the work of Charles Taylor offers another pathway to explore how we arrive
from mere objective spirit to something absolute. He explains:

Hegel’s way (to use my jargon) was to recapture the upshot of his
hermeneutical dialectics, tracing our development in history, by what claimed
to be an ontic dialectic, unfolding the necessary connections in being. The
most central of these latter in his system were set out in the Logic. If the
development of Reason in history turns out not to be just the way things
happened to fall out, but is in fact the necessary unfolding of the stages of Geist
and Reason itself, then we have an unchallengeable grounding in reality and
truth itself. (Taylor, 1999, pp. 158-159).

On this view, Taylor acknowledges the commonalities, realities and transparencies that are a
component of our moral history itself shaping a search to create a fusion of horizons between

people and their cultures. However, I have argued that if we do not know what we are doing
then it is possible for us to act in ways that are open to variable and heterogenous actions. The
difference-commonality conundrum involves nurturing the type of connections between people
needed to create civil society. The question then becomes one associated with how do we judge
and make distinctions in such a world view concerning what is ethical and objective? Again,
Taylor usefully offers a different means to consider the role of language and meaning in human
communities. He explains:

[The]

understanding which is relevant to the sciences of man is something

more than this implicit grasp on things. It is related rather to the kind of
understanding we invoke in personal relations when we say, for instance: ‘I
find him hard to understand’; or ‘at last I understand her’. To switch for a
minute to another language, it is the kind of understanding one invokes in
French when one says ‘maintenant on s’entend’. We are talking here in these
cases of what you could call human understanding, understanding what makes
someone tick, or how he feels or acts as a human being. (Taylor, 1980, p. 30).

For Taylor, once an action has been disclosed it reveals itself, its purpose, as well as the practices
in which it operates. Irrespective of how an action is interpreted, it reveals itself as significant for
its ‘being in the world’ (Taylor, 1980). This means that all discourse can be settled in that all
values are no more than a reflection of subjective preferences – all that remains is relativism and
the play of difference. Here, Dreyfus argues that Rorty’s search for ‘consensus’ and ‘agreement’
ignores the background values shaping language and interpretation. Dreyfus notes:

They hope that by seeking a shared agreement on what is relevant and by
developing shared skills of observation, etc., the background practices of the
social scientist can be taken for granted and ignored the way the background is
ignored in natural science. (Dreyfus, 1980, pp. 16-17)

Dreyfus’s ‘strong hermeneutic’ involves embedded coping that is characteristic of humanity’s
perceptual skills that can be confirmed and checked against reality. 4 People are directly in touch
with the world and its significant values. Modern secular theories fail to recognise this and have
put humanity on a wrong pathway.
Last, Derrida, Butler and Roberts do not explore how better interpretations build up our
appreciation of the world. As long as someone feels that something has been left out of the
objective account he may be inclined to propose and defend an interpretation of what that
nontheoretical residue is and what it means for human action (Dreyfus 1980). It is probably for
these reasons that interpreters find aspects of the postmodern immersed in relativism and do not
critically interpret the practices that shape our lives. The postmodern stance does not examine
how the social sciences provide different ways to understand humanity and the way nature
involves not only thoughts and ideas but skilful coping and our everyday ability to live in the
world. While it might be the case that ‘science is in fact zeroing in on (one aspect of) the

4

Dreyfus notes that Taylor’s most recent work can answer the brain in the vat objection. In a possible world
it might be the case that we are not really embodied or coping agents engaged with the world because we
are given the impression that we are by an outside agent. No matter how unlikely this scenario is, Dreyfus
notes that it can be met by noting that it an agent’s perception that matters. Rorty therefore overlooks
Taylor’s claim that this is a totally different way in which humans create knowledge, engage with the
world, and understand its limits.

physical universe as it is in itself’ it does not explore how our experiences influence our actions
(Taylor in Dreyfus, 2004, p. 75.). Taylor argues:

Once we see the emptiness of the myth of the Given, our problem is somehow
to bring this free spontaneity together with constraint. In order to stop the
oscillation between the need for grounding which generates the myth of the
Given, and the debunking of this myth, which leaves us with the need
unfulfilled, ‘we need to recognize that experiences themselves are states or
occurrences that inextricably combine receptivity and spontaneity’, 5 we have to
be able ‘speak of experience as openness to the lay-out of reality. Experience
enables the lay-out of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a
subject thinks.’ (Taylor in Dreyfus, 2004, p. 58).

Our basic experiences themselves put us in touch with the world – simply put we do not always
utilize our thinking skills when acting in the world. We have basic innate coping skills that
allow us to get about in the world. As such we are not detached contemplators making our way
about in the world, but engaged agents to whom articulation and interpretations shape our beingin-the-world. Our individual beliefs do not simply mirror the in-itself-of-the-world, but involve
our active engagements in that world.
Ultimately, postmodern inspired theorists move too fast and ignore our embedded grasp
of reality as it gives us access to the world. While Derrida and other similar thinkers would view
the Tayloian seeing a relationship with the world more primordial than representation, there is in

5

McDowell, Mind and World, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 58.

fact no necessary ‘break between nonlinguistic and linguistic interactions for organisms (or
machines) with the world’. 6 This is because the only difference between such interactions is that
‘what we call interactions “linguistic” when we find it helpful to correlate the marks and noises
being produced by other entities with the ones we ourselves make.’ 7 However Rorty, who
follows Donald Davidson on this point, does not explore how the sciences of man have different
ways to reveal meaning. There is more to the human condition than simply satisfying economic
appetite and new insights involve interactions with the world.

Intelligent Accountability
The exploration into transparency began by analyzing the panic of investor confidence in the
2007 financial crisis which was arguably stimulated by this lack of transparency; by the fact that
no one knew what exposures their counter-parties had, and in this way risk that had apparently
been widely dissipated was suddenly everywhere. Roberts has also shown that we cannot
manage only with transparency – our instinct to invest in yet more transparency as the only
remedy for the failures of transparency – but rather should see transparency as at best a
supplement to more context specific ‘intelligent’ accountability.

The transparency of ‘fair

value’, coupled with intense individual performance incentives, was arguably itself part of the
problem; feeding ‘over optimism’ in financial markets, as well as the subsequent panic as asset
values were written down (see Roberts & Jones, 2009). He explains:

Significantly, informed insiders to the credit crisis have subsequently suggested
the need not only for enhanced transparency, but also for new forms of
6

7

See Rorty, R., Charles Taylor on Truth’, in Rorty, R., Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume 3,
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 96.
Ibid., p. 96. (also see Heidegger, ‘The Thing’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 170).

accountability that supplement reliance on risk management models with
institution wide brain storming around sources of risk, and that supplement
institutional disclosure against Basel 11 with regular meetings between central
bankers and individual institutions to review systemic risk (CRMPG, 2008).

In attempting to enquire into the construction of a new ethic on which to base accountability and
transparency the analysis turns to the Other as specified by Heidegger. But before I move into an
analysis of the structure of difference and being it is important to remember that Roberts turns to
Butler and Levinas to explore the imperative to meet the ideals of transparency as it gives rise to
a particular form of ethics: Butler argues that transparency is a form of ‘ethical violence’ and
‘moral narcissism’: for Butler the pursuit of high ideals with violence and yet I think that
accountability as transparency is often characterised by an anxious paranoia.

Violence describes my own relationship to myself – the ways in which I
constantly berate the self for being less than ideal – as well as the ways in
which I seek temporary relief from such selfpersecution through finding
opportunities to attack the failures of others. Similarly, narcissism seems not to
belong with morality. Yet the effect of accountability as transparency seems all
too often to be a defensive or assertive preoccupation only with myself, and my
own continuous self improvement and advancement, which has as its correlate
an indifference to, or neglect of the interdependencies within which my own
self interest is nested. Cynical disidentification can seemingly offer me some
distance from the threat of transparency but often serves only to make my

practical conformity easier.

The subjective correlate of the pursuit of a

complete transparency is the pursuit, or at least presentation, of an already
perfect self; of a self that knows what it is doing.

However a reliance on Butler and Levinas requires exploring the implications of an ethic that
focuses on the Other. Will it achieve its aim? Can it create the necessary sociality that is
requisite for the construction of an accountable world. This returns us to the aim of Heidegger’s
work as it explored the being of Dasein. For Roberts, it is Levinas who offers an ethic for the
Other as a means to engage Dasein: but what is meant here is really the being of existence.
Heidegger began by enquiring into the Greeks in order to discover on what the understanding of
existence which is Greek is stood. This is not a mere archaeology or historiography: the same
question needs to be posed toward Lévinas concerning how is it possible (and so on what ground
or basis) for him to think what he thinks?
As is well known Heidegger and Levinas offer an exploration into our eschatological
existence – a focus on our own death from which we cannot escape, it is our own-most
(eigentlich) possibility. Here we recall Lévinas’s claim that I do not have the right to leave the
other alone to his death. But this is not Heidegger’s point: it is not that we need to be alone to die
— indeed, to die well may well be to die surrounded by those dearest to us — but rather only I
can work out for myself what it will mean for me and how to die well. For Heidegger it is our
being-in-the-world as reflected in the concept of throwness that requires ontological analysis.
Implicit in any analysis into the limits of transparency is an affiliation with the
commonalities and difference conundrum. From postmodern quarters accountability, closeness,
forgiveness and openness reflect an anxious paranoia – an excessive focus on the individualistic

and narcissistic culture that we have created. From the vantage point offered through this focus
on commonalities the quest then becomes concerned with bringing people together despite their
difference: the additional aim is to create through our organisational and social structures a fabric
that nurtures those commonalities despite our differences.
Interpretation worthy of its association with forgiveness and transparency involves coming to
terms with the fragility of our current institutions and conceptions of accountability.

Conclusion
The paper began by exploring Derridean aporias that have been introduced into accounting and
accountability research by John Roberts. I offered a different way to think about how to choose
between such binary oppositions such as those between transparency and (non)-transparency. I
offered an Aristotelian and Taylorian way to think about bringing members of corporations and
organisations together in a spirit of magnanimity that harks back to our understanding of freedom
as it relates to a radical understanding of our being-in-the-world. This reworking has important
implications for not only the natural sciences but also accountability and organisational research
as it attempts to re-align itself from the contours associated with a focus on economic growth at
the expense of disclosing the world.
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